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CHAPTER 11
CANADA
by Kim Brooks 1

11.1.

Introduction: General characteristics of Canadian corporate income tax

As with most countries, Canada taxes corporations as separate legal entities. Once a country
decides to tax corporations as separate entities, tax law drafters face a series of difficult tax
design questions, including:
1. What legal entities should be classified as corporations for the purposes of imposing a
separate income tax on them?
2. Whether all of those legal entities that fall within the prescribed category of a
corporation (which would undoubtedly include the smallest incorporated business in
the country and the largest multinational operating in the country) should be subject to
the same treatment or whether the category “corporations” should be divided up in
some way and different types of corporations subject to different tax treatment?
3. Although these first two questions are difficult, once a decision is made to tax
corporations as separate entities, some of the most perplexing issues in designing a
coherent corporate tax system centre around the question as to what extent the
appropriate tax unit should be individual corporations or groups of related
corporations?
Although different countries have taken vastly different approaches to each of these three
questions, on the first two questions Canada’s approach can be fairly described as
conventional. Relating to the first question, the income tax is imposed on “every person
resident in Canada”. 2 A “person” is defined as including “any corporation” and “corporation”
is defined as including an incorporated entity. 3 Based on this admittedly sparse statutory
direction, the Canadian courts have defined a corporation for tax purposes by relying solely
on the legal form of the entity. If an entity is incorporated under the federal or a provincial
company act, the entity is taxed as a corporation; if it is not so incorporated, it is not taxed as
a corporation, even though it might have all of the legal and economic characteristics of a
corporation, such as limited liability, centralized management, transferability of beneficial
interest and continuity of life. 4 This legalistic approach to defining a corporation naturally
gives rise to problems of classifying foreign entities and an ongoing need for the legislature
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to draft specific anti-avoidance rules as taxpayers plan around the intended separate tax on
corporations, most recently through the extensive use of income trusts, but, generally, the
approach can be fairly described as consistent with that used in most countries. 5 6
On the second issue, the categorization of corporations, again, the Canadian approach,
although somewhat unique, conforms to the general pattern of legislation across countries.
Generally, all corporations are taxed the same. However, in attempting to deal with the
problems of not discouraging small business from incorporating and preventing individuals
from using corporations to shelter portfolio investments from tax (and a few other minor
issues), corporations are divided broadly into private and public companies, and some rules
apply only to one type of corporation or the other.
Where Canada departs most obviously from what might be described as the international
best, or at least internationally most common, practice is with respect to the third issue.
Income tax legislation in most countries is based on the premise that the appropriate
corporate tax unit is closely associated or related corporations, not individual corporations. In
particular, most countries provide for the consolidation of corporate losses and other tax
attributes within a corporate group. In some countries, this is provided by allowing related
corporations to file a consolidated return. In other countries, members of a related group of
corporations each file a separate tax return; however, corporations in the group are given the
option of transferring certain tax attributes, for example, a loss for tax purposes, to one or
more of the other corporations in the group. In contrast to this broad recognition of the
corporate group in most countries, in Canada, the basic corporate tax unit is the individual
corporation. 7 Indeed, in Canada, not only must each corporation compute their income and
tax payable separately, but also the legislation expressly prohibits corporations from using
any form of equity or consolidated method of accounting. 8
Although the Canadian tax system begins with the assumption that each corporation is a
separate taxpaying entity, the legislation is replete with instances where a mutuality of
interest between corporations is recognized and for some specific purposes corporations are
allowed or required to share or transfer tax attributes. A bewildering variety of concepts that
describe the “relatedness” of corporations are used for this purpose.
This chapter first reviews some of the history and reasons as to why the consolidation of
corporate groups has not been adopted in the Canadian income tax legislation. It then
describes some of the instances where a mutuality of interest between corporations is
recognized, the objectives of recognizing a group of corporations in these instances and the
measures of relatedness used to group corporations in these instances. Measures that allow
5.
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Rates and Losses in the OECD: Can Canada Compete?”, (April 3, 2006) Tax Notes International (3 April 2006)
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corporations to share tax attributes, and in particular corporate losses, in the domestic context,
are examined first and then a few measures that allow for the sharing of tax attributes crossborder are reviewed. However, before proceeding with this review, in order to provide some
context, a few other broad outlines of the Canadian corporate tax system should be
mentioned.
Like most industrialized countries, Canada purports to tax income on a global basis.
Taxpayers aggregate their income from different sources and are generally able to offset
losses from one source against gains from another source in arriving at their global income to
which the tax rates are applied. However, since some special timing rules, allowable
deductions and loss-restriction rules only apply to particular sources of income, taxpayers
must calculate separately their income from each employment, business and property, and
their capital gains. In particular, and perhaps most notably, capital gains, both at the
individual and corporate level, are taxed at preferential rates. Capital gains are only taxed
when they are realized and only one half of the capital gain is included in the taxpayer’s
income; similarly, only one half of capital losses are deductible.
Losses from one business are generally deductible from income from other businesses and
other sources of income. 9 If a corporation does not have sufficient income from other
businesses or sources to offset a business loss, or if a corporation chooses not to use all of its
losses in a particular year, the losses may be applied against income earned in other tax years.
Subject to certain conditions, the basic rule is that non-capital losses (i.e. business losses)
may be carried back three years or forward 20 years to reduce taxable income. 10 If a business
recognizes a capital loss (a loss on the disposition of capital property) the loss can only be
offset against capital gains. Net capital losses may be carried back three years or carried
forward indefinitely. 11 When a loss is carried forward or backward, the value of the loss is
not adjusted to reflect its time value.
Although Canada lacks formal rules permitting consolidation of corporate returns, its
legislation does permit one corporation to use the losses of a related corporation if the
corporations reorganize through an amalgamation or a winding up of one into the other. Also,
the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) has taken the position that loss utilization within a
related group through any one of a number of tax planning strategies does not, in and of
itself, constitute a violation of the policy underlying the Income Tax Act. However, the
Agency has argued strongly against any tax planning strategy that would permit loss trading
among unrelated corporations. 12
One further aspect of the Canadian tax system that is important in considering any form of
consolidated reporting – indeed, that has arguably proved to be consolidation’s Achilles’ heel
in Canada – is the fact that corporate income tax is levied both by the federal government in
Canada and by each of the ten provincial governments and two territories. Although the
computation of the precise corporate tax rate is not without difficulty, and it is being reduced
slightly each year, the federal corporate tax rate in 2008 is about 20%. The rates among the
ten provinces and two territories vary from about 10% to 16%. If a corporation does business
in more than one province it must allocate its taxable income for purposes of applying the
9.
Sec 3.
10.
Para. 111(1)(a).
11.
Para. 111(1)(b). There are other categories of losses delineated in the Act, for example, farm losses, but
these are not addressed in this overview.
12.
See infra note 44.
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provincial corporate tax rates to those provinces in which it has a permanent establishment.
The allocation is done on the basis of an equal weighting of the percentage of its gross
revenues from the permanent establishment in the province and the percentage of the salaries
and wages paid by the establishment. Although all of the provinces have their own corporate
income tax, most simply piggy-back on the federal definition of taxable income and have
entered into tax collection agreements with the federal government under which the federal
government collects the provincial portions of the corporate income tax and returns their
respective shares to the provinces. Among other concerns, whenever consolidation is
considered in Canada, the provinces worry that it might result in profits earned in a particular
province being offset by losses incurred in another province.

11.2.

A brief history of consolidated reporting in Canada 13

1917–1932
Separate unit taxation – Canada’s first income tax was enacted near the end of the First
World War, in 1917. Corporations were defined as persons subject to tax and their taxable
income was taxed at a rate of 4%. No provision was made for consolidated filing.
1932–1952
Experimenting with consolidated filing – Canada’s Income War Tax Act was amended in
1932 to allow corporations to file a consolidated return. 14 15 As enacted, the provision was
quite restrictive; it only applied to the parent corporation of wholly owned subsidiaries
carrying on the same class of business. Moreover, corporations filing a consolidated return
were subject to an additional 1% surtax. 16 Over the next 20 years, the provision was further
restricted. To prevent parent corporations from offsetting Canadian profits with losses that
were incurred in a subsidiary operating abroad, the provision was amended in 1935 to restrict
the application of the provision to companies carrying on business in Canada. This restriction
was further tightened in 1948 when the Act was amended to require both that the companies
electing to file consolidated returns be resident in Canada and carrying on business in
Canada. 17 In addition, the 1948 amendments added the requirement that parent and
subsidiary companies have identical fiscal periods. 18 To prevent companies from choosing to
consolidate their returns in one year, but not consolidate them in the next year, simply as an
attempt to reduce their taxes owing, in 1939, the provision was amended to prevent
companies from electing to file consolidated returns for a period of five years after a previous
election was revoked. The consolidated return provision remained in the legislation for 20
13.
Brief reviews of this history can be found in Hershberg, S., “Consolidated Returns: A Tax Policy
Perspective”, 27 Canadian Tax Journal 552 (1979) pp. 556–561; and Richardson, S., “Transfers of Deductions,
Credits, or Losses Within Corporate Groups: A Department of Finance Perspective” in Report of Proceedings of
the Thirty-Sixth Tax Conference, 1984 Conference Report, Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1985, pp. 737–
754, at 738–742.
14.
R.S.C. 1927, c. 97.
15.
Subsection 35(3), which was added by S.C. 1932-33, C. 41, Sec. 13 provided: “A company which
owns or controls all of the capital stock (less directors’ qualifying shares) of subsidiary companies which carry
on the same class of business, may elect within the time and in the manner prescribed by regulations, to file a
return in which its profit or loss is consolidated with that of its subsidiaries, in which case the tax provided by
paragraph D of the First Schedule of this Act shall apply.”
16.
This surtax was increased over time – to 1.5% in 1935 (SC 1935, c. 40, Sec. 2) and to 2% in 1936 (SC
1936, c. 38, Sec. 1).
17.
S.C. 1948, c. 52, Sec. 75(1).
18.
The 1935 amendments added the requirement that parent companies have fiscal periods that were
“substantially coincident” with their subsidiaries. S.C. 1935, c. 40, Sec. 13.

4

years. It was eventually repealed in 1952. 19 The government justified the decision to repeal
consolidated returns on the basis that the Act had been amended to introduce loss carryover
provisions. 20 The government noted that with the introduction of loss carryover provisions,
only companies that had consistent losses would gain any advantage from consolidated
reporting and those companies should not be able to deduct their losses against the profits of
other companies in the same group. 21
1966
The Carter Commission advocates a return of consolidated reporting – In 1962, in part
because of the fear of the erosion of the corporate tax base due to the proliferation of
dividend stripping arrangements, the Canadian government appointed a Royal Commission to
comprehensively review the Canadian tax system. The Royal Commission on Taxation
(widely referred to as the “Carter Commission”, after its Chair Kenneth LeM. Carter)
released its 5-volume report in 1966. 22 Among its hundreds of recommendations for
improvements in the Canadian tax system, the Commission recommended that Canada adopt
consolidated reporting for wholly owned companies. The Commission offered two main
justifications for their recommendation: (1) that it would reduce the inefficiency created by
companies operating entirely within one corporate entity instead of in a more appropriate
corporate group simply to enable loss use; and (2) it would provide for a better measure of a
company’s (or a group of company’s) ability to pay. The Commission acknowledged that the
United States and the United Kingdom permitted consolidation at 75% and 80% common
ownership, but concluded that the complexity of dealing with minority interests were too
significant to merit anything less than 100% common ownership.
1967–1972
Canadian government rejects consolidated filing – The Canadian government spent five
years studying the Carter Commission recommendations. In 1969, it produced a White Paper
on tax reform for public discussion in which it set out its own recommendations of
comprehensive tax reform. In many respects these recommendations represented watereddown versions of the Carter Commission’s recommendations. Its recommendations with
respect to consolidated reporting are representative of this conservative approach to tax
reform. The White Paper recommended that corporations be given the option of filing as a
partnership and thus be given the ability to flow-through their losses to their shareholders. It
suggested that this partnership option made consolidated reporting unnecessary since it would
allow corporations operating in a group to flow losses through to other corporations in the
group. 23 In any event, following the government’s extensive consideration of tax reform
19.
See the short history of the 1950’s repeal in Richards Petrie, J., The Taxation of Corporate Income in
Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1952) pp. 95–96.
20.
House of Commons, Debates, 21st Parliament, 4th Session, Vol. 92 (18 June 1951) pp. 4232–33. Rules
allowing the carryover of business losses were introduced in 1942. (Income War Tax Act, S.C. 1942-43, c. 28,
Sec. 33.)
21.
Commentators have speculated that another reason for the change was that prior to 1952 the rules that
permitted the use of losses from one source of income against another were very restricted. Given that those
rules were liberalized with the proposed changes, the value of the consolidated reporting rule was diminished.
See Richardson supra note 13 p. 741.
22.
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, (1966) (Chair:
Kenneth LeM. Carter), v. 4, pp. 260–1.
23.
Canada, Department of Finance, Proposals for Tax Reform, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, (1969), pp. 63–
64. Instead of suggesting a return to consolidated reporting, the 1969 report concludes that “[t]he government
considers that its proposal whereby a corporation can be treated as a partnership would permit groups of
corporations to achieve the same result as they would under consolidated returns. Therefore, the government
does not propose to provide for consolidated returns as such.”
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options over this five-year period, neither the consolidated return recommendation nor the
partnership option was implemented in the Tax Reform Act of 1972. Parenthetically, it might
be noted that the during this tax reform process the Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and
Commerce held hearings and prepared a report on the government’s White Paper on tax
reform. This committee’s report is widely regarded as representing the views of the business
community on tax reform. It recommended that corporations that were members of a
qualifying group be permitted to elect to file on a consolidated return basis. 24
1978
Budget hints at the introduction of consolidated filing – Following the enactment of the Tax
Reform Act of 1972, the business community and tax practitioners continued to press for the
ability of related corporations to file consolidated returns. 25 Yielding somewhat to this
pressure, in the documents released along with its 1978 annual budget, the federal
government stated that it was considering adopting some form of consolidated filing. 26 The
documents noted that although the existing legislation permitted the liberal utilization of
losses between related corporations, often business considerations and complex and
expensive reorganization requirements discouraged the transfer of losses. However, the
government noted three reservations: (1) the legislation would be complex; (2) in particular
because of the variations in the rates of corporate income tax between the provinces, there
might be opportunities for tax minimization by, for example, deducting losses in a province
in which tax rates were low against profits earned in a province where tax rates were higher;
and (3) there might be substantial revenue losses. 27 In the end, the government did not
proceed further with its plans for some form of consolidated filing and the three concerns that
it expressed have dominated the debate ever since. 28 However, the reference to the possibility
of allowing consolidated filings further piqued the interest of the tax profession in the idea.
At the Canadian Tax Foundation’s annual conference in 1979, a number of substantial papers
were presented on the utilization of losses in corporate groups. 29 Further, as these suggestions
often do, it provided the inspiration for a law graduate thesis by Susan Hershberg,

24
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(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1982) at 315.
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The following papers are all found in the Thirty-First Tax Conference, 1979 Conference Report (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 1980): Glen Cronkwright, “The Utilization of Losses in Corporate Groups and
Further Relief that Might be Taken” at 316 – 327; Herbert H. Alpert, “Intra-Group Utilization of Losses in the
United State – The Consolidated Return” at 328-351; Michael Aidin, “Provisions For the Utilization of Losses
Within Corporate Groups Under the United Kingdom Tax Law” at 351-364; and Helmet Bredeek, “Utilization
of Losses in Corporate Groups – Is Relief Needed – Under German Tax Law” at 365-380.
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“Consolidated Returns: A Tax Policy Perspective”, which, in turn, has been relied upon
extensively by the present and subsequent authors on the subject in Canada. 30
In his budget in the spring of 1984, the Minister of Finance hinted that the government might
again be considering a form of consolidated reporting. Once again, tax practitioners prepared
a hefty set of papers making the case for tax consolidation.31
1985
The Wilson Report: designing a loss transfer system for Canada – In 1985, the federal
government released a paper (widely referred to as the “Wilson Report” after the then
Minister of Finance, Michael Wilson) that invited further discussion of the transfer of losses
between related corporations. 32 The paper not only included a discussion of tax
consolidation, but also set out in draft legislation one possible design. The paper suggested
that a reconsideration of consolidated reporting was appropriate largely for three reasons: (1)
to improve the economic neutrality and equity of the tax system; (2) to enhance the impact of
corporate tax incentives; and (3) to increase the ability of businesses to structure their
corporate affairs to achieve the most efficient organization. 33 The document recognized that
the common methods for using losses in a group were amalgamations and wind-ups, but
conceded that there were “important factors that make this approach undesirable or
impossible, including the need to maintain management independence, financial
considerations, limiting of liability, effects of regulation and the existence of minority
shareholders.” It went on to note that “[t]he review of the existing ability to use losses in
commonly-owned groups indicates there is a broad range of circumstances where losses
cannot be used, as well as considerable variation in the means by which corporations are able
to use losses.” 34
The Wilson Report set out three possible approaches to consolidated filing. First, it reviewed
“full consolidation systems,” which would require consolidated groups to essentially ignore
altogether the separate status of the corporations that comprise the group. Second, it
considered “refundable or negative tax systems,” which would entail the recognition of
separate entities, but which would allow the losses of subsidiaries to be refunded up to the
aggregate amount of income in the other corporations in the group. Third, it examined
“deduction or loss transfer systems,” which would recognize the separate legal status of the
corporations in the group, but permit one corporation to transfer its losses to another.
The drafters of the Wilson Report evaluated each of the three possible methods of achieving
loss consolidation against four criteria: complexity, a single economic entity benchmark,
government revenue effects and the ability to accommodate loss transfer or consolidation
30.
27 Canadian Tax Journal (1979) pp. 552–575.
31.
The following papers appear in the Thirty-Sixth Tax Conference, 1984 Conference Report, Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 1985: Couzin, R., “Income Taxation of Groups of Corporations: The Case for
Consolidation” pp. 715–737; Richardson, S. R., “Transfers of Deductions, Credits, or Losses Within Corporate
Groups: A Department of Finance Perspective” pp. 737–754; Conkwright, G. E., “A Proposed System of
Transfers of Deductions, Credits, or Losses Within Corporate Groups” pp. 755–768; and Macdonald, W.,
“Nontax Considerations in Transfers of Deductions, Credits, or Losses Within Corporate Groups” pp. 769–782.
32.
Canada, Department of Finance, A Corporate Loss Transfer System for Canada (May 1985). Marc
Lalonde, then Minister of Finance, foreshadowed this paper in an announcement made on 18 May 1984.
33.
The report concludes: “the government is sympathetic to the arguments put forward in favour of a
group reporting system for single economic entities and it is prepared to consider practical group reporting
systems that would provide appropriate tax results.” (Id. p. 8)
34.
Id. pp. 1–2.
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systems at the provincial level. After evaluating each of the possible approaches against these
criteria, the Report recommended the deduction or loss transfer system. Under this approach,
Canadian corporations meeting a 95% ownership test would be able to elect annually to
transfer non-capital losses between corporations in the group. The transferee corporation
would deduct the transferred loss in computing its taxable income and the transferor
corporation would reduce its loss by the amount transferred. 35
Despite the fact that the Wilson Report presented a detailed blueprint for a system of
consolidation – and despite the fact that tax practitioners warmly welcomed its
recommendations – the federal government did not implement the recommendations.
Although a number of reasons have been given as to why consolidated reporting was not
implemented, the most likely explanation is that the federal government at the time was
involved in a number of political disputes with the provinces and was not willing to override
their objections to such an amendment of the federal income tax legislation. Some provinces
were concerned that because of the formula for allocating corporate taxable income to the
provinces, the proposal would result in a revenue loss for them; that the cost of provincial tax
incentives in one province might be borne by the treasury in another province; that
corporations might be able to engage in tax avoidance transactions that would arbitrage the
various provincial tax rates; and, that the adoption of consolidated reporting would result in
pressure for uniformity in provincial corporate tax systems and thus a reduction in provincial
flexibility in achieving particular revenue and economic policy objectives. 36
In the late 1980s, in an attempt to encourage an even more wide-ranging discussion of the
issues surrounding consolidated reporting, the Clarkson Gordon Foundation initiated a
research study of the Canadian income tax treatment of losses. The study resulted in eight
commissioned papers, many of which represent a thorough and original contribution to the
relevant tax policy literature. 37 However, despite the significance and depth of the studies,
little subsequent discussion of the Canadian tax treatment of corporate losses ensued.
1996
Auditor General endorses consolidated reporting – The Office of the Auditor General in
Canada audits all federal government operations. It has frequently audited CRA functions. In
1996, it audited the methods used by the CRA in enforcing the Income Tax Act in respect of
large corporations. In the course of reaching its conclusions in that audit, it expressed three
concerns about the Canadian loss utilization rules in particular. 38 First, that corporate
taxpayers had no certainty that the CRA would uphold the loss consolidation arrangements
that they had entered into. Second, that the transactions required to achieve loss consolidation
were extremely complex. Third, that the CRA was adopting administrative policies to deal
with loss consolidations within corporate groups that were not necessarily sanctioned by the
income tax legislation. The Auditor General recommended that to solve these problems the

35.
Corporate Loss Transfer System for Canada, supra note 32, pp. 13–17.
36.
These and other concerns about the Wilson Report recommendations are reviewed in the papers in the
Thirty-seventh Tax Conference, 1985 Conference Reports, Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1986,
Richardson, S. R., “A Corporate Loss Transfer System for Canada: Analysis of Proposals”, chap. 12; and
LePan, N., “Federal and Provincial Issues in the Corporate Loss Transfer Proposal”, chap. 13.
37.
Clarkson Gordon Foundation, Policy Options for the Treatment of Tax Losses in Canada, Toronto:
Clarkson Gordon Foundation, 1991.
38.
Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Ottawa: Public Works
and Government Services, November 1996, chap. 37: Revenue Canada – Enforcing the Income Tax Act for
Large Corporations, paras. 37.23–37.27.
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government should reconsider the recommendations of the Wilson Report for a corporate loss
transfer system.
1997
Mintz Committee urges review of the recommendations of the Wilson Report – In 1996, the
government appointed a committee to examine all aspects of the Canadian corporate tax
system to ensure, among other things, that is was not unduly hindering economic growth and
job creation. The Technical Committee on Business Taxation (the “Mintz Committee”, after
its Chair, Jack Mintz) again revisited the possibility of group loss relief. In its report, the
Committee reviewed some of the circumstances where corporations are able to share losses
within a related group under the Canadian tax legislation. 39 Despite generally considering
these provisions to present a reasonable compromise between competing tax policy
objectives, the Mintz Committee recommended that, “the federal government should
consider, in consultation with the provinces, a formal system of transferring losses between
members of the same corporate group starting with a review of the 1985 federal discussion
paper.” 40 The Committee also noted that if some form of loss transfer was adopted, the
federal government should review the ability of taxpayers to claim some deductions (for
example, capital cost allowance) on a discretionary basis. 41
2007
State of play – Every year in their brief to the government, Canada’s senior corporate tax
executives urge the adoption of some form of loss consolidation. 42 However, there appears to
have been little serious movement on the issue in the last ten years.

11.3.

Domestic income tax legislation on groups

11.3.1. Overview
In order to implement both the technical policy judgments underlying the tax legislation and
the extraneous social and policy objectives pursued through the use of tax expenditures, the
Canadian income tax is riddled with a bewildering variety of concepts that define the
relationship between two or more corporations (or corporations and individuals and other
legal entities). The four most important concepts are related persons, non-arm’s length
relationships, affiliated persons and associated persons. In the next few subsections, the
circumstances in which the relatedness of corporations has significant tax consequences (or
stated differently, the circumstances when tax consequences turn on a recognized group

39.
In researching various aspects of Canada’s corporate tax system for its report, the Mintz Committee
commissioned a working paper on the effects of the treatment of tax losses on the efficiency of the market for,
and the incidence of mergers. Poitevin, M., “Effects of the Fiscal Treatment of Tax Losses on the Efficiency of
Markets and the Incidence of Mergers” Working Paper 97-13 Prepared for the Technical Committee on
Business Taxation, Ottawa (February 1998).
40.
Canada, Report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation, Ottawa: Department of Finance,
1997 (Chair: Jack Mintz) p. 4.18.
41.
Id.
42.
Most recently, see Daubaras, D. & St. Pierre, N., “TEI’s Recommendations to the New Canadian
Government for its 2006 Budget Legislation,” (May-June, 2006), 58(3) The Tax Executive (May-June 2006), pp.
221–225 at 224. See also the Department of Finance response to questions at the Tax Executives Institute’s
annual meetings in 1996 and 1999 about whether the Department is considering changes to the treatment of
corporate losses.
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relationship between corporations) are described together with the details of the concept that
is used to define that relationship. In summary:
•

Loss transfers – If corporations are related, it is possible through the reorganization of the
corporations, or through the use of financing or other arrangements, to shift a loss from
one corporation to another.

•

Imposition of transfer pricing rules – If corporations are not dealing with one another at
arm’s length, transfers of goods and services between them must take place at fair market
value.

•

Application of stop loss rules – If corporations are affiliated, a loss cannot be recognized
if an asset with an accrued loss is transferred from one to the other.

•

Allocation of annual small business limit – If corporations are associated they must
allocate among themselves the annual small business limit.

11.3.2. Loss transfers – related corporations
11.3.2.1.

Related persons

The most important concept of relatedness between corporations under the Income Tax Act is
the concept of related persons. If corporations are related to one another, or part of a related
group of corporations, basically, losses can be transferred from one corporation to the other.
This cannot be done, of course, by filing a consolidated return. Instead, the corporations must
engage in some form of reorganization or use some form of financing or other arrangement to
transfer the loss. The CRA takes the view generally that as long as tax planning involves the
transfer of losses among related corporations it does not result in a misuse or abuse of the Act
or its provisions and therefore will not be struck down by the General Anti-Avoidance
Rule. 43 The corollary, of course, is that the CRA will generally challenge an attempt to
transfer losses between non-related corporations.
Basically, one corporation will be related to another if one controls the other. “Related
persons” are defined in subsections 251(2) and (3). 44 Pursuant to those subsections, a
43.
See, for example, the CRA’s administrative policy on loss consolidations between related corporations
as set out in Hiltz, M., “Revenue Canada Forum” in Report of Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Tax Conference,
1994 Conference Report, Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, (1995), 47:1–20 at 47:2: “the transfer of income
or deductions between related corporations that is accomplished using transactions that are legally effective and
comply with any applicable provisions of the Income Tax Act … would not usually result in a misuse of the
provision of the Act or an abuse of the Act read as a whole, for the purposes of applying the general antiavoidance rule.” See also Canada Revenue Agency, Income Tax Technical News No. 30 (21 May 2004). In this
Technical News release, the CRA addressed the question: “What are the basic parameters of loss utilization
transactions, and what is the basis in law for these?” In their reply, the CRA noted: “There is a scheme to the
Act, evidenced by certain provisions, including subsections 69(11) and 111(4) to 111(5.2), that restrict the
claims by corporations for losses, deductions or credits incurred by a non-affiliated corporation. However, these
limitations do not apply to transactions between affiliated corporations. In addition, several other provisions of
the Act, notably the stop-loss provisions, prevent the recognition of losses on transactions undertaken within a
corporate group. From this we can conclude that there is a scheme to the Act recognizing and accepting certain
transactions between affiliated corporations as being undertaken by the same corporate group.” p. 6.
44.
Subs. 251(3.1) through (6) also address when particular taxpayers will be related.
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corporation will be related to another corporation if any of the following conditions are
satisfied:
–
–
–
–

–
–
–
–

–

it is controlled by another corporation, or by a related group of corporations (subparas.
251(2)(b)(i) and (ii));
the other corporation is related to its controlling shareholder or related group of
shareholders (subpara. 251(2)(b)(iii));
both corporations are controlled by the same person or group of persons (subpara.
251(2)(c)(i));
each of the corporations is controlled by one person and the person who controls one
of the corporations is related to the person who controls the other corporation (subpara.
251(2)(c)(ii));
one of the corporations is controlled by one person and that person is related to each
members of an unrelated group that controls the other corporation (251(2)(c)(iii));
one of the corporations is controlled by one person and that person is related to each
member of an unrelated group that controls the corporation (251(2)(c)(iv));
any member of a related group that controls one of the corporations is related to each
member of an unrelated group that controls the other corporation (251(2)(c)(v));
each member of an unrelated group that controls one of the corporations is related to at
least one member of an unrelated group that controls the other corporation
(251(2)(c)(vi)); or
the other corporation is related to a third corporation, and the third corporation is
related to it (subpara. 251(3)).

Key in determining whether two corporations are related is whether one controls the other.
Somewhat surprisingly, the basic concept of control is not defined for the purposes of these
provisions. Although there is a voluminous amount of jurisprudence on the meaning of the
concept of control in this context, basically, the courts have held that control means de jure or
legal control. That is to say, one person controls a corporation if the person owns more than
50% of its voting shares. Generally, to determine whether one corporation has legal control
over another, tax practitioners rely on the meaning of control articulated in the well known,
and always cited, case of Buckerfield’s Ltd. 45 In that case control in the context of
determining whether corporations were related was held to mean “the right of control that
rests in ownership of such a number of shares as carries with it the right to a majority of the
votes in the election of the Board of Directors.” 46 The degree to which a 50% plus one voting
interest in a corporation will grant a shareholder “control” of the corporation may be less
clear than the Buckerfield’s test suggests. Subsequent cases suggest that in some
circumstances a corporation will need to do more than a mere arithmetic calculation to
determine whether it has control, particularly where the issue is whether control is exercised
by a group. 47
45.
Buckerfield’s Ltd. et al. v. M.N.R., [1964] C.T.C. 504 (Ex. Ct.).
46.
Id. p. 507.
47.
See, for example, Yardley Plastics of Canada Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1966] C.T.C. 215 (Ex. Ct.) (The
Exchequer Court left open the possibility that a group of persons may have control of a corporation despite the
fact that another group of persons owns more than 50% of the voting shares); and Oakfield Development
(Toronto) Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1971] C.T.C. 283 (S.C.C.) (Although a group of shareholders held only 50% of the
voting shares, and another group held the remaining 50%, based on the ability to cause a formal dissolution of
the company and to participate in the distribution of surplus profits on a winding-up, the Court found that the
50% group of common shareholders had control.) But see, Vina-Rug (Can.) Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1968] C.T.C. 1
(S.C.C.) (The Court held that once a group of shareholders held over 50% of the voting shares of a company it
had control.)

11

11.3.2.2.

Transferring losses through a merger or winding-up of a related corporation

Most commonly, corporations wishing to transfer a loss to a related corporation do so by
reorganizing, either by an amalgamation or by a winding up. If certain conditions are met, the
Canadian income tax legislation provides rollover relief for both of these corporation
reorganizations. In other words, there is deemed to be no disposition of assets or liabilities
either at the corporate or the shareholder level. If related Canadian corporations amalgamate
pursuant to the rollover provision, the new corporation is deemed to be the same corporation
as, or a continuation of, each predecessor corporation for the purpose of determining its
corporate losses. 48 Although the new corporation cannot generally carry back losses to a
predecessor corporation, it can carry losses forward. 49 50 An amalgamation triggers a deemed
year-end, therefore, an amalgamation may result in a short fiscal period in the year of
amalgamation.
A rollover, similar to that available for amalgamating corporations, is also available when a
subsidiary is wound-up into its parent, provided that both the parent and subsidiary are
Canadian corporations, the parent owns at least 90% of each class of the subsidiary’s shares,
and the remaining shares are owned by persons with whom the parent is dealing at arm’s
length. 51 The tax attributes of the wound-up subsidiary are taken over by its parent. Thus, the
subsidiary’s losses may be carried forward by the parent. 52 The corporate losses of a
subsidiary retain their source and character when they become corporate losses of the parent.

11.3.2.3.

Transferring losses to related corporations through tax planning
arrangements

In addition to combining related corporations (one with a loss and the other with profits)
through an amalgamation or winding up, tax planners in Canada use a range of other
strategies for shifting losses between corporations in a related group including the use of taxdeferred asset transfers, shifting of deductions and financing expenses, and charging
management and service fees. 53 For example, a corporation may transfer a profitable business
to a related loss company using a rollover provision that permits a taxpayer to transfer assets
to a corporation in return for shares.54 Provided certain conditions are met, the taxpayer will
48.
Sec. 87.
49.
Where a parent corporation amalgamates with one or more of its wholly-owned subsidiaries (a
“vertical short-form amalgamation”) there is an exception to the carry back rule and the new corporation may
carry back losses (subs 87(2.11).
50.
Subs. 87(2.1).
51.
Sec. 88.
52.
See subs. 88(1.2).
53.
For a more detailed discussion of some of these techniques see Desloges, P. & Marley, P., “Canada” in
Group Taxation, The Netherlands: International Fiscal Association, 2004, pp. 207–213; Hirsch, M. P., “The
Corporate Loss Transfer System” in Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Tax Conference, 1985 Conference
Report, Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1986, p. 13:1; Raizenne, R. & Williamson, D. M., “Canada” in Tax
Treatment of Corporate Losses, The Netherlands: International Fiscal Association, 1998, pp. 386–388;
Stadtegger, A. G., “Corporate Loss Utilization: Where Are We Now and What Can Be Done?”, Report of
Proceedings of the Fifty-Fifth Tax Conference, 2003 Conference Report, Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation,
2004, pp. 30:1–30:19 at 30:9–30:12; and Suarez, S., “Tax Planning with Losses in Canada” (August 1, 2005)
Tax Notes International (1 August 2005) pp. 451–462.
54.
Sec. 85.
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be able defer recognition of any gain accrued on the assets. The losses in the related
corporation can then be used to offset the profits realized on the transferred assets. An even
more straightforward method to transfer losses between related corporations is simply to
structure inter-company charges to locate increased profits in loss companies. A company
with profits may arrange to shift its administrative functions, for example, to a related
company with losses, and then pay the loss company a management fee for the provision of
those administrative services. Similarly, a loss company could arrange to acquire assets it
could then lease to a related profitable company. Lastly, one of the most popular forms of
loss sharing involves arranging for a profitable company to contribute capital to a related loss
corporation in return for equity capital; the loss company then loans the funds back to the
profitable company, which in turn makes tax deductible interest payments to the loss
company. The taxable interest payments in the loss company are offset by its losses. Thus, in
effect, through the tax treatment of the interest payments, the losses are being offset against
the profits in the related corporation.

11.3.2.4.

Quarantining of losses: The acquisition of control

Although losses can be transferred between related corporations in Canada by reorganizing
corporations in a group or by engaging in a number of tax planning strategies, losses cannot
be transferred between unrelated corporations. The primary mechanism for ensuring that
losses are not transferred between unrelated corporations is a set of rules that quarantine
losses when control of a corporation is acquired. These acquisition-of-control rules adopt the
legal definition of control, and although that rule would appear to be straightforward to apply,
whether control of a corporation has been acquired can, of course, be difficult to determine in
some cases. 55 56
Where an acquisition of control has occurred, the net capital losses of a corporation simply
expire. 57 Such losses cannot be carried forward nor, of course, can net capital losses arising
in years subsequent to the acquisition of control be carried back.
Business losses can be carried forward after a change in control but they are quarantined. 58
Basically, they can be carried forward after an acquisition of control only if (1) the acquiring
corporation continues to carry on the business in which the loss occurred and (2) the
acquiring corporation has a reasonable expectation of making a profit in that business.
Furthermore, even if both of these conditions are satisfied, the loss can only be applied
against income generated by the same or a similar line of business that incurred the loss.
There are a number of rules designed to preserve the integrity of these restrictions on loss
transfers between related corporations. Most importantly, immediately before the acquisition

55.
Subs. 256(7) sets out some circumstances where an acquisition of control is deemed to have occurred
or deemed not to have occurred. Generally speaking, control will be deemed not to have been acquired where
there is a continuity of interest.
56.
See, for example, Couzin, R. & McDonnell, T., “Policy Options: Reforming Current Provisions” in
Policy Options for the Treatment of Losses in Canada, Toronto: Clarkson Gordon Foundation, 1991, pp. 9:1–
9:40; Donnelly, M. & Young, A., “The Associated Corporation Rules: Getting Tax Reduction Under Control”
46 Canadian Tax Journal (1998), pp. 589–625; Kellough, H. & McQuillan, P., Taxation of Private
Corporations and Their Shareholders, Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999, chap. 13.
57.
Sec. 111(4).
58.
Sec. 111(5).
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of control a corporation is deemed to have a year-end.59 This rule prevents the losses of the
unrelated corporation to be deducted from the profits of the acquiring corporation in the year
of acquisition. In addition, there are a series of rules designed to prevent the carryover of
losses that have accrued in property owned by the acquired corporation. In effect, the
property of the acquired corporation with accrued losses is deemed to be disposed of for fair
market value immediately before the acquisition and the loss is recognized. 60 This rule
prevents unrelated corporations from being acquired solely to trigger the accrued losses on
property. The Act contains several specific anti-avoidance rules that apply in the acquisition
of control context. For example, one specific anti-avoidance rule applies where control of a
corporation is acquired and it may reasonably be considered that the main reason for the
acquisition of control was to recognize accrued losses. 61 Another deems shares to have been
acquired at the time the taxpayer acquired an option where it can reasonably be concluded
that one of the main purposes of the acquisition of the right or option was to avoid any
limitation on the deductibility of any non-capital loss, net capital loss or farm loss. 62

11.3.3. Imposition of transfer pricing rules: Non-arm’s length persons
To prevent corporations who share a degree of economic mutuality from shifting tax
attributes of assets among themselves by selling or giving them to one another for less than
fair market value, the Act requires, basically, transfers between non-arm’s length persons to
take place at fair market value. 63 Arm’s length persons are defined as including “related
persons” and, in addition, the definition of arm’s length includes a factual test that allows for
the determination by administrators and judges of whether or not in fact persons are related to
each other at a particular time. 64 In determining whether parties do deal with each other at
arm’s length in fact, the CRA and courts have generally looked to the directing mind of the
corporation, whether the corporations act in concert, and whether one corporation controls the
other based on the factual circumstances of the arrangements. 65

11.3.4. Application of stop loss rules: Affiliated persons
To the extent that tax systems tax gains on capital property, generally they only tax such
gains when the gains are realized, that is, when the property is sold or otherwise disposed of.
If gains accrued on capital properties are only taxed when they are realized, then the tax
system needs rules to prevent taxpayers from realizing the accrued losses on capital property
simply by selling the property to a related person, such as a controlled corporation, with
whom the taxpayer is in a position of economic mutuality. The aim of these rules is to ensure
that no loss can be realized where a taxpayer transfers property to someone with a sufficiently
close relationship such that it might be assumed that the risk associated with the property has
not actually been transferred. Without such rules, gains on capital property would be taxed on
a realization basis while losses would be allowed, essentially, on an accrual basis. The
59.
Subs. 249(4).
60.
See, for example, for non-depreciable capital property para. 111(4)(c) and for depreciable property
subs. 111(5.1).
61.
Sec. 111(5.5).
62.
Sec. 256(8).
63.
Sec 69.
64.
Para. 251(1)(a).
65.
Canada Revenue Agency, Interpretation Bulletin 417R2, “Meaning of Arm’s Length” (8 June 2004).
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Canadian tax system has a whole series of so-called “stop loss” rules designed to prevent the
triggering of accrued losses when property is disposed of to a related person. Just by way of
example, Canada has a rule, familiar to most tax systems, to prevent the realization of losses
on wash sales. When non-depreciable property is transferred by a taxpayer, and within a 61day window (30 days before or after the transfer), the transferor or an affiliated person
acquires the property or a right to the same or identical property, the loss is denied. 66
The concept of relatedness that the act uses to trigger these rules is not “related” or “arm’s
length” but “affiliated.” Generally, an affiliated group of persons is defined as a group of
persons each member of which is affiliated with each other member. 67 For example, a
corporation is affiliated with another corporation if:
–

it is controlled by the other corporation (either on its own or as a member of an
affiliated group) (para. 251.1(1)(b));
– -the controlling shareholders of each corporation are affiliated (subpara.
251.1(1)(c)(i));
– a particular affiliation exists between its controlling shareholder or group of
shareholders and the controlling group of shareholders of the other corporation
(subparas. 251.1(1)(c)(ii) and (iii)).
In terms of the scope of this rule for corporate taxpayers, the only major difference between
the definition of affiliated persons and the definition of related persons, is that the definition
of affiliated persons relies on the broader concept of control in fact, while the definition of
related persons relies on the more restricted concept of legal control. 68

11.3.5. Allocation of annual small business limit: Associated corporations
Under the income tax legislation, Canadian controlled private corporations earning active
business income pay a low rate of tax on their first $400,000 of earnings (a combined rate of
about 20% instead of about 36%). The concept that is used to ensure that each individual is
only entitled to claim one small business credit regardless of how many corporations they
form is the concept of associated corporations. Associated corporations are required to
allocate the annual small business limit among themselves.
Associated corporations do not need to have any dealings with each other, nor do they need
to have similar businesses, or even have any factual association. Two corporations are
associated if:
–
–

one controls the other (para. 256(1)(a));
both corporations are controlled by the same person or group of persons (para.
256(1)(b));

66.
See Subs. 40(3.3) and (3.4) and the definition of “superficial loss” in Sec 54.
67.
Sec. 251.1.
68.
In the context of the affiliated persons definition, “controlled” is defined in Subs. 251.1(3) to mean
“controlled, directly or indirectly in any manner whatever”.
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–

each corporation is controlled by one person, each controlling person is related to the
other, and either of those controlling persons owns at least 25% of the shares of any
class of the other controlled corporation (subsection 256(1)(c)); 69
– one corporation is controlled by a person that is related to each member of a group that
controls the other corporation and owns at least 25% of the shares of that other
corporation (subsection 256(1)(d));
– each corporation is controlled by a related group, each member of one of the related
groups is related to all of the members of the other related group, and one or more
persons who are members of both related groups own at least 25% of the shares of any
class of each corporation (subsection 256(1)(e)); and
– each corporation is associated if they are both associated with the same third
corporation (subs. 256(2)).
As with the meaning of control in the affiliated relationship definition, control in the context
of associated corporations is de facto control.70

11.4.

Specific international rules

11.4.1. Overview
The Canadian tax rules relating to the taxation of the foreign-source income of Canadian
corporations, and which determine the tax treatment of corporate groups operating in more
than one jurisdiction, have a number distinguishing characteristics. Again, some of these
characteristics are shared with the tax systems in other industrialized countries; others are
uniquely Canadian.

11.4.2. Branch versus subsidiary
Like most countries, the ability of a Canadian corporation to use losses it incurs operating
outside Canada depends on whether it carries on its foreign business through a branch or a
subsidiary. Generally, business losses incurred by a foreign branch of a Canadian corporation
can be offset against the corporation’s Canadian profits. Conceptually, the losses are treated
as having been incurred by a Canadian taxpayer. Branch losses are subject to the same
general rules as losses incurred in a Canadian corporation that confines it activities entirely
within Canada. If, however, the Canadian corporation incorporates a subsidiary in a foreign
jurisdiction to carry on its overseas business activities, generally it will be unable to deduct
any losses incurred in its foreign business activities from its Canadian profits. Unlike, the
rules that explicitly or implicitly allow related corporations to share losses incurred in
Canada, generally, Canada’s legislative framework is designed to prevent any loss sharing in
cross-border situations even between related corporations.71
Correspondingly, profits earned by a foreign branch are taxed to the Canadian corporation as
they accrue, while profits earned by a foreign subsidiary are exempt from tax or taxed only
when repatriated. In ongoing debates in Canada over its international tax rules, it has been
argued that there are compelling theoretical and practical reasons for exempting all foreign
69.
For paras. 256(1)(c)–(e) where the class of shares are part of a “specified class” as defined in Subs.
256(1.1) the corporations will not be associated.
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business income from Canadian tax regardless of the form in which the business is carried on,
whether through a foreign corporation or a branch. Presumably such a change would also
limit the offset of all foreign losses from Canadian-source profits. It does seem somewhat odd
that corporations should be able to elect, in effect, whether their foreign losses can be offset
against their Canadian profits by manipulating the business form in which those foreign
losses are realized.

11.4.3. Exemption versus credit for active business income
In balancing the competing notions of capital export and import neutrality in relation to the
foreign-source active business income of Canadian multinationals, Canada recognizes the
primary entitlement of the source country’s taxing jurisdiction and the need for Canadian
multinationals to be able to compete when doing business in foreign jurisdictions. It does this
by providing, basically, that active business income earned by the foreign affiliates of
Canadian corporations in countries with which Canadian has a tax treaty are exempt from
Canadian tax and that the Canadian tax on active business income earned in non-treaty
countries is deferred until the earnings are repatriated, at which time they are subject a grossup and credit mechanism. A corporation not resident in Canada is a foreign affiliate of a
taxpayer resident in Canada, and thus eligible for the exemption system, if the following two
tests are met: (1) the Canadian taxpayer's "equity percentage" in the non-resident corporation
is not less than 1%; and (2) the total of the equity percentages of the taxpayer and of persons
related to the taxpayer in the non-resident corporation is not less than 10%.72 If a foreign
corporation is not a foreign affiliate of a Canadian corporation, any income earned by
Canadian corporations from it are taxed on a remittance basis and are eligible for tax relief
under the foreign tax credit mechanism. Again, as in a number of countries, there is an active
debate in Canada as to whether Canada should adopt a straight territorial system with respect
to active business income.

11.4.3.1.

Active versus passive income

Like most tax systems, the Canadian international tax rules distinguish sharply between
foreign-source active business income and the foreign-source passive or investment income
of Canadians. Generally, while foreign-source active business income earned in foreign
affiliates will usually be exempt from Canadian tax, passive income is taxed at full Canadian
tax rates on an accrual basis. In particular, the passive income (or technically the foreign
accrual property income (FAPI)) of a controlled foreign affiliate is taxed on a full accrual
basis in Canada, with relief provided from double taxation. A "controlled foreign affiliate" of
a taxpayer is defined as a "foreign affiliate" of the taxpayer controlled by (1) the taxpayer, (2)
the taxpayer and not more than four other persons resident in Canada, (3) not more than four
persons resident in Canada, other than the taxpayer, (4) a person or persons with whom the
taxpayer does not deal at arm's length, or (5) the taxpayer and a person or persons with whom
the taxpayer does not deal at arm's length.73 These so-called foreign accrual property income
(FAPI) rules are intended to prevent taxpayers from realizing a deferral advantage that might
otherwise be available to Canadian taxpayers earning income that is considered highly mobile
and for which Canada derives no competitive advantage in having it located overseas. The
rules are backed up by rules dealing with non-resident trusts and foreign investment entities.74
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11.4.4. Protecting the Canadian tax base
Lastly, in order to preserve the integrity of the rules under which Canadian-source business
income is taxed on an accrual basis and foreign-source income is frequently exempt from tax,
the Canadian tax system contains a number of familiar “base erosion” rules in its foreign
affiliate system to prevent taxpayers from converting taxable Canadian-source income into
exempt foreign-source income.
The transfer pricing rules require companies that do not deal at arm’s length to enter into
transactions for tax purposes that reflect arm’s length dealings.75 These rules prevent
companies from using pricing as a mechanism for eroding their taxable Canadian tax base.
Another rule, which has relatively recently undergone significant broadening, prevents
Canadian corporations from indirectly soaking up losses in their foreign affiliates by lending
them capital at low or no interest.76 If a corporation resident in Canada makes such a loan, the
rule imputes the difference between the interest charged and a prescribed rate of interest to
the Canadian corporation.
Canada also has a thin capitalization rule to prevent the Canadian tax base from being eroded
by excess interest expenses generated by non-resident corporations highly leveraging their
Canadian subsidiaries.77 If the rule applies to a loan, the proportion of the interest that relates
to the debt that is in excess of two times the equity of the corporation is not deductible.
In addition, the Department of Finance has recently proposed legislation to prevent the
deduction of interest in “double-dip” cross-border structures.

11.4.5. Foreign affiliate rollovers
The Act does provide for a rollover of the shares of a foreign affiliate to another corporation
that also qualifies as a foreign affiliate on a tax-deferred basis pursuant to subsection 85.1(3).
The rollover rules for foreign affiliates work generally in the same way as the rollover rules
for domestic reorganizations. To qualify for the rollover, the taxpayer must have disposed of
shares that are capital property, those shares must have been shares of the capital stock of a
foreign affiliate, the disposition must be to a corporation that immediately following the
disposition was a foreign affiliate of the taxpayer, and the consideration for the disposition
must include shares of the capital stock of the foreign affiliate.
The Act also provides for rollover treatment pursuant to subsection 85.1(5) where
shareholders exchange shares of one foreign corporation for shares of another foreign
corporation. To qualify for the rollover several conditions must be met, including: (1) both
the corporations must be resident in a country other than Canada; (2) the foreign purchase
must issue its own shares to a vendor as consideration for the acquisition of the exchanged
foreign shares; (3) the shares given up by the vendor must be shares of the capital stock of
another corporation resident in a country other than Canada that were capital property of the
vendor immediately before the exchange; and (4) the vendor must not have included any
portion of the gain or loss on the exchange in income in the year the exchange occurred. A
taxpayer will not qualify for this rollover if a range of conditions are met, including if the
vendor and foreign purchaser were not dealing with each other at arm’s length immediately
before the exchange, and if immediately after the exchange the vendor (with persons with
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whom the vendor did not deal at arm’s length) either controlled the foreign purchaser or
beneficially owned shares of its stock with a fair market value of more than 50%.78 79
In addition, Sec. 86.1 provides for tax deferral where there is a foreign spin-off or
demerger.80 Section 86.1 allows for rollover treatment of some eligible distributions.

11.4.3. Groups and Tax Treaties
Generally speaking, Canada’s tax treaties follow the OECD Model Convention. To that end,
most of Canada’s treaties include many of the OECD provisions that delineate the
relationship between companies with some form of relationship where the companies are
resident in different Contracting States, including:
–

The fact that a company which is a resident of a Contracting State controls or is
controlled by a company which is a resident of the other Contracting State, or which
carries on business in that other State (whether through a permanent establishment or
otherwise), shall not of itself constitute either company a permanent establishment of
the other (Art. 5(7) of the OECD Model).

–

The provisions set out in Art. 9 that permit transfer pricing adjustments (in addition to
the OECD provisions in Art. 9, the Canadian treaties also generally include a
paragraph that addresses the conditions under which the other Contracting State is
mandated to make a consequential adjustment, and a paragraph that states that no
obligation is imposed on Canada in the case of fraud, wilful default or gross
negligence).

–

The provision set out in Art. 10(2) that sets a reduced rate of withholding tax on
dividends where a beneficial owners of the company holds a minimum amount of the
shares of the company paying the dividends.

–

The provisions in Art. 11(6) (interest) and 12(4) (royalties) that adjust the taxation of
interest/royalty payments where by reason of a special relationship between the payer
and the beneficial owner or between both of them and some other person, the amount
of interest/royalty exceeds the amount that would have been agreed to in the absence of
the special relationship.

–

Canada’s tax treaties generally have less extensive non-discrimination provisions than
those suggested in Art. 24 of the OECD Model.

In addition, Canada’s income tax treaties generally contemplate that each party to the treaty
will preserve the rollover treatment granted by the Contracting States. For example,
paragraph 8 of Art. XIII of the Canada–US Tax Convention provides:
Where a resident of a Contracting State alienates property in the course of a corporate or other
organization, reorganization, amalgamation, division or similar transaction and profit, gain or income
with respect to such alienation is not recognized for the purpose of taxation in that State, if requested to
do so by the person who acquires the property, the competent authority of the other Contracting State
may agree, in order to avoid double taxation and subject to terms and conditions satisfactory to such
competent authority, to defer the recognition of the profit, gain or income with respect to such property
for the purpose of taxation in that other State until such time and in such manner as may be stipulated
in the agreement.
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A similar paragraph can be found in Canada’s tax treaties with other jurisdictions.

11.5.

Time for a reconsideration of consolidated reporting in Canada?

The current Canadian system for dealing with loss transfers between related corporations is
far from ideal. First, the system is inequitable because some corporations are able to utilize
losses that are inaccessible to other corporations, even though the economic situations of both
corporations are identical. For example, some corporate groups may be in a position to
consolidate through amalgamations or windings-up to access and utilize corporate losses
within the related group, while other corporations may not be in the position to consolidate
for other reasons, including, the imposition of legal requirements restricting business entity
choice, protection of management independence, financing considerations, maintenance of
limited liability, presence of minority holdings, protection of corporate identity or labour
concerns. In these circumstances, it is inequitable for the first group of companies to be able
to access the corporate losses of related companies while the second group cannot.
Second, the rules provide strong incentives for corporations to structure themselves to take
advantage of corporate losses within the group where possible, creating inefficiencies. Where
corporations are structured to access certain tax consequences, economic inefficiencies
inevitably arise. To the extent possible, the tax system should be designed in a manner that is
neutral as between corporate structures chosen by corporations. The tax rules may result in
increased business costs. Notably, corporations may lose the ability to structure businesses
separately to take advantage of local management, separate boards of directors, certain
financing opportunities or the ability to structure employment agreements in the most
effective manner.81 These additional costs result in less economically effective corporations.
The corporate loss rules, as currently designed, also result in high transaction costs for
corporations that attempt to share losses. Significant management resources are consumed,
contracting costs are incurred and tax and corporate legal advice may be needed to ensure
that corporate reorganizations designed primarily to utilize losses in ways permitted under the
Income Tax Act do not run afoul of the rules.
The restrictions on loss carryovers following an acquisition of control are also flawed. First,
the rules are inequitable because the value of a particular corporation’s tax losses will depend
entirely on circumstances beyond its control. If a corporation carries on business in an
industry where there are many similar businesses earning profits, the value of its tax losses
will be much greater than a corporation with losses carrying on business in a smaller industry
with fewer profitable businesses.
Second, the rules restricting the transfer of losses may encourage corporations to carry on
business long after it would otherwise have been efficient to cease operations. For example, if
a corporation has realized business losses for several years in a row, it may continue to carry
on business in the hope of finding another company who will acquire it and be able to use
those losses, despite management’s knowledge that the company will never be profitable
without additional synergies being realized through a takeover.
Third, the rules restricting loss use on an acquisition of control skew what might otherwise be
the incidence of takeover bids. Where a takeover may be efficient, for example, where a
takeover would increase synergies by improving operating efficiencies or reducing agency
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costs, the tax rules should not discourage investors from entering into purchase
arrangements.82 Although determining whether the market for takeovers is efficient (and the
extent of the efficiency) is a complex question beyond the scope of this chapter, it is clear that
uncertainty created by the acquisition of control rules, and the increased costs of such rules,
may impede take-overs that would otherwise increase efficiency.83
Fourth, the arbitrary acquisition of control rules result in transactions structured inefficiently
to avoid their application. For example, a shareholder may purchase shares right to the 50%
limit, but not in excess of that limit, to avoid the application of the acquisition of control
rules. However, it may be significantly more effective for the particular shareholder to
acquire in excess of that percent of the shareholdings.
In addition to the inequities and inefficiencies created by Canada’s current tax loss utilization
regime, the system is far from administratively easy to administer and compliance with the
rules can be difficult. In other words, the inequities and inefficiencies are not well balanced
with administrative simplicity and ease of compliance. Hopefully, a review of Canada’s
history is not merely a review of the past, but possibly presents a prediction for the future –
that Canada will reconsider its position on consolidated reporting and move in line with other
OECD Member countries.
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